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When Anna Weiner moved from a New York 
publisher to a Silicon Valley start-up, she was 
stunned by the way people spoke. The technol-
ogy firm she worked for hired ‘a man who 
spoke in inscrutable jargon and maintained a 
robust fleet of social media accounts: He had 
thousands of followers and behaved as if he was 
an influencer. He was constantly changing job 
titles on a website where people voluntarily 
post their resumes, giving himself promotions 
to positions that did not exist’ (Weiner, 2020, 
pp. 162–3). Weiner was stunned when ‘the 
influencer brought a scooter into the office and 
rolled about barking into a wireless headset 
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2 Organization Theory 
about growth hacking: value prop, first moved 
advantage, proactive technology, paralelliza-
tion. Leading edge-solutions. Holy grail’. ‘It 
was garbage language to my ears’, Weiner 
writes, ‘but the customers loved him. I couldn’t 
believe it worked’ (ibid).
The ‘garbage language’ Weiner stumbled on 
is not unique to Silicon Valley. Organizations in 
many industries are infused with similar lan-
guage. The ex-Financial Times journalist Lucy 
Kellaway collected up some examples in her 
‘guffopedia’. They include ‘chief pollinator’, 
‘iconicity’ and ‘loincloth strategy’. Stephen 
Poole’s (2013) dictionary of management speak 
has entries on ‘thought shower’, ‘drill down’ 
and ‘going forward’. Another dictionary of 
business jargon includes ‘consumer centric’, 
‘fast track’, ‘talent pipeline’ and ‘going granu-
lar’ (Watson, 2015). Sometimes these terms 
refer to precise ideas. But more often, they are 
meaningless and misleading forms of commu-
nication. In other words, they are bullshit.
Bullshit is a ‘discourse which is created, circu-
lated and consumed with little respect for or rela-
tionship to reality’ (Spicer, 2013, p. 654). It is 
‘crafted to wilfully mislead and to serve the 
bullshitter’s purposes’ (ibid; see also Christensen, 
Kärreman, & Rasche, 2019; Spicer, 2017; 
McCarthy, Hannah, Pitt, & McCarthy, 2020). 
Existing accounts explain bullshit with reference 
to individual characteristics of the bullshitter (e.g. 
Frankfurt, 2005), to psychological propensities of 
the audience (e.g. Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, 
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015), or wider social 
structures (e.g. Graeber, 2018), In this paper, I 
claim bullshitting is a social practice. I will argue 
that in particular speech communities people are 
encouraged to play the language game of bullshit-
ting, and when it is played well it can bolster their 
identity. Under certain conditions, bullshitting is 
relatively harmless and can even be beneficial. 
But bullshitting can quickly spiral out of control 
and take over an entire organization or industry.
I will argue that bullshitting is triggered by 
a speech community with many conceptual 
entrepreneurs, significant amounts of noisy 
ignorance and permissive uncertainty. These 
conditions are likely to spark the language 
game of bullshitting. This entails people artic-
ulating empty and misleading statements that 
are processed in a shallow way and lead to 
surface-level agreement. When this game 
works, it can enhance the image and identity of 
players. If this happens, they are likely to 
engage in further rounds of bullshitting and 
reinvest in the speech community which per-
petuates bullshitting. When the game back-
fires, it can undermine the players’ identity 
and image. This makes them less likely to 
want to play the bullshit game again and rein-
vest in the speech community which encour-
ages bullshitting. When bullshitting reinforces 
players’ image and identity, it increases the 
scale and scope of bullshitting. As a conse-
quence, bullshitting can evolve from being 
informal interaction into a routine practice, a 
formalized procedure and even a sacred ritual. 
When bullshitting misfires, it can be under-
mined. This can mean that what were previ-
ously seen as sacred statements end up being 
viewed as bullshit.
To make this argument, I proceed as follows. 
First, I outline the evolving history of the con-
cept of bullshit. After considering existing 
explanations of bullshit, I make the case for see-
ing bullshit as a social practice. I develop a 
model of how the social practice of bullshitting 
works in organizations. In the discussion, I 
chart how bullshitting can either scale up or be 
undermined. In the conclusion, I draw out some 
of the implications of this analysis, the limita-
tions of my argument and lines for future 
research which it opens up.
What Is Bullshit?
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, 
bullshit is an informal vulgar term which means 
‘to talk nonsense, especially with the intent of 
misleading or deceiving’. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines bullshit as ‘to talk nonsense 
or rubbish’ and ‘to bluff one’s way through 
something by talking nonsense’. The word is 
rooted in ‘bull’ which has been used from the 
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17th century onwards to mean nonsense. This 
in turns derives from the Old French term bole 
which means fraud and deceit.
During World War I ‘bullshit’ entered infor-
mal British, North American and Australasian 
English speech. The lexicographer Eric Partridge 
(2006, p. 152) claimed that during World War I, 
British commanding officers emphasized ‘bull’. 
This meant paying significant attention to sol-
diers’ appearances by ensuring they were per-
fectly dressed and their shoes were shined, even 
when this focus on appearance hindered the daily 
tasks of waging war (see also Frankfurt, 2005). 
Australian and New Zealand troops mocked 
British officers by calling it ‘bullshit’. Partridge 
suggests the term became common in military 
life during World War II. Throughout this period, 
it was used to refer to excessive regimentalism 
and attention to appearances. For instance, if sol-
diers prepared their quarters for inspection by a 
commanding officer, they engaged in ‘bullshit’. 
Partridge gives the following example: ‘We’ve 
got to get this place bullshitted up—the 
Commanding Officer is coming around tomor-
row morning.’ The troops used the term ‘bullshat’ 
to refer to something which has been polished up 
for display purposes. For instance, ‘Don’t touch 
that, it’s just been bullshat!’ ‘Bullshit’ was also 
closely connected with high-level administra-
tion. For instance, during World War II, New 
Zealand airmen referred to the air-force head-
quarters as the ‘bullshit castle’.
The term bullshit entered into print during 
World War II. The first instance of the word 
recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary is in 
a dictionary of North American slang published 
in 1942. A Google n-gram search shows a rapid 
growth in the use of the word in published 
sources from the early 1960s onwards. But it 
was only in 1986 that the term received a 
detailed philosophical treatment. In an article 
originally printed in a specialist journal in 1986 
then republished as a book in 2005, Harry 
Frankfurt set about defining bullshit. While 
lying is an attempt to conceal the truth (Bok, 
1978), bullshit is to talk without reference to the 
truth. ‘It is just this lack of connection to a 
concern with truth – this indifference to how 
things really are – that I regard as the essence of 
bullshit’, Frankfurt writes (p. 33). Underpinning 
this is a ‘motive guiding and controlling’ the 
bullshitter meaning they are ‘unconcerned with 
how the things about which he speaks truly are’ 
(p. 55). To illustrate this, Frankfurt recounts an 
encounter between the philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and his friend and Russian teacher, 
Fania Pascal. While Pascal was convalescing in 
hospital after having her tonsils removed, she 
received a call from Wittgenstein. Pascal said ‘I 
feel like a dog that has been run over.’ 
Wittgenstein told his friend ‘You don’t know 
what a dog that has been run over feels like.’ 
Although the philosopher’s response is 
unfriendly in the extreme, it does make a logical 
point. Strictly speaking, a human can’t know 
what a run-over dog feels like.
G. A. Cohen (2002) challenged Frankfurt by 
arguing that bullshit does not only entail seeking 
to more or less intentionally ‘mislead with respect 
to reality’ (Cohen, 2002, p. 329). Cohen pointed 
out that sometimes ‘the shit wears the trousers’ (p. 
324). Instead of focusing on the bullshitter’s inten-
tions, he argues, we should look at the structure of 
bullshit. Cohen goes on to identify ‘unclarifiable 
unclarity’ as the key feature of bullshit 
(p. 333). These are statements which are unclear 
(‘unclarity’) but for which there are no procedures 
to make it clear (‘unclarifiable’). A bullshit state-
ment is ‘not only obscure but cannot be rendered 
unobscured’. Furthermore, ‘any apparent success 
in rendering it unobscured secretes something that 
isn’t recognizable as a version of what was said’ 
(p. 332). To illustrate this point, Cohen returns to 
his days as an earnest young PhD student obsessed 
with the writings of the French Marxist, Louis 
Althusser. He explains how he found ‘the material 
hard to understand’, and when he did ‘extract 
what seemed like a reasonable idea from one of 
their texts, I attributed it more interest or more 
importance . . . than it had’. His struggle to under-
stand the texts and his subsequent use of this 
Althusserian language was not driven by a desire 
to mislead, but by the inherent ‘unclarifiable 
unclarity’ of the French philosopher’s texts.
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Frankfurt and Cohen’s papers have inspired a 
growing field of ‘bullshitology’. Much of this 
research broadly accepts the insights in both 
papers, but points out that there is need to look 
at bullshitting as a form of communication. This 
means understanding the interactions between 
bullshitters, the language of bullshit and audi-
ence (Christensen et al., 2019). Recent psycho-
logical research (e.g. Pennycook et al., 2015) 
considers the targets of bullshit by examining 
how some people with an ‘uncritical open mind’ 
are particularly receptive to bullshit. More soci-
ologically oriented research has pointed out that 
in some social settings ‘bullshit’ is expected, 
enthusiastically embraced or silently tolerated 
(Christensen et al., 2019, pp. 1595–97).
Based on these different strands of thinking, I 
am now in a position to identify the core compo-
nents of bullshit. The first component are empty 
claims. This means bullshit is characterized by an 
indifference to the truth (Frankfurt, 1986) or pro-
cesses of truthful inquiry (Cohen, 2002). Bullshit 
entails claims which are disconnected from nor-
mal standards of truth such as logic, clarity and 
evidence (Spicer, 2017). The second core aspect 
of bullshit is that it is misleading. Bullshit is asso-
ciated with ‘mis-representational intent’ 
(Meibauer, 2018) such as deceiving (Frankfurt, 
2005), confusing (Cohen, 2002) or even avoiding 
questioning (Carson, 2016). The third core aspect 
of bullshit is that it entails communication. 
Bullshit is a form of linguistic interaction 
(Christensen et al., 2019). It involves characteris-
tic patterns of communication such as evasive-
ness or not being held to account for one’s claims 
(Littrell, Risko, & Fugelsang, 2020). Bringing 
these three aspects together, I define bullshit as 
empty and misleading communication. A more 
substantive definition of bullshit is that it consists 
of evasive and/or persuasive communication 
involving an indifference to the truth or attempts 
to pursue the truth which are driven by epistemi-
cally maligned intentions.
What Isn’t Bullshit?
Before examining the underlying structure of 
bullshit, it is worth pausing to point out the 
differences between bullshit and other similar 
concepts. Bullshit is frequently differentiated 
from lying. A lie is a statement which the liar 
believes to be false but they present as if it is 
true, often with intentions of deceit (Bok, 1978). 
In contrast, bullshit is not presented as if it were 
true and the intention behind it is not always 
outright deception. This distinction is captured 
by Frankfurt (2005) who argues that a liar is 
concerned about the truth, but attempts to 
replace it with falsehood. In contrast, the 
bullshitter is unconcerned with the truth and 
speaks with no reference to it. The bullshitter 
falls short of lying because they make use of 
insincere and misleading statements rather than 
outright falsehoods. Recent psychological work 
has found that established measures of every-
day lying are sufficiently distinct from bullshit-
ting (Littrell et al., 2020).
A second concept which is relatively close to 
bullshit is jargon. Jargon is technical language 
which is often tied to prestigious bodies of 
knowledge such as science, the arts and reli-
gion. It helps the speaker to be precise and com-
municate ideas quickly with other initiates, but 
it also hampers communication with the non-
initiated (Vilhena et al., 2014). Fluent use of 
jargon can be a marker of community member-
ship, which creates identity but also entry barri-
ers (Sokal & Bricmont, 1998). It can also create 
a sense of secrecy around the community, mak-
ing discussions understandable only to the initi-
ated (Halliday, 1976). While jargon might seem 
nonsensical to the outsider, it is highly mean-
ingful and sensible to insiders. It is also loaded 
with its own logic, empirical references and it is 
at least potentially decipherable. Finally, jargon 
is not typically used to mislead members of the 
community. Rather, it is used to communicate 
things which are meaningful within that com-
munity. It is worth noting that jargon can be 
used to mislead or confuse people who are not 
initiates in the community originating the jar-
gon (Feldman, 2008).
A third type of language which is similar to 
bullshit is the ambiguous statement. This might 
seem empty because it is difficult to define and 
can be attributed with multiple meanings 
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(Eisenberg, 1984). For instance, managerial 
buzzwords are ambiguous because they can 
refer to a very wide range of things. Ambiguous 
statements might be maddening to the precise 
mind of an analytic philosopher, but they are a 
characteristic part of everyday life. For instance, 
managers use ambiguous concepts as part of 
their day-to-day work (Abdallah & Langley, 
2014; Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Jarzabkowski, 
Sillince, & Shaw, 2010). When making ambig-
uous statements, managers do not always have 
malign intentions to mislead or deceive others. 
Managers can use ambiguity to facilitate action, 
create agreement between conflicting factions, 
open up ground for exploration and discovery, 
or simply fill in a conversation (Eisenberg, 
1984). Cohen (2002) acknowledges ambiguous 
statements can generate novel social, cognitive 
or aesthetic experience. However, ambiguous 
statements which are used to mislead or deceive 
are more properly identified as ‘bullshit’.
There is a final type of statement which 
should not be strictly considered to be bullshit. 
These are statements which are empty and mis-
leading but do not entail communication. The 
idea of an uncommunicated statement may 
seem like an oxymoron. For something to be a 
statement or claim, it needs to be communi-
cated with another person. Perhaps the closest 
we might get to uncommunicated empty and 
misleading claims is ‘bullshitting ourselves’. 
This is when we engage in empty and mislead-
ing self-talk. For instance, a would-be entrepre-
neur might mislead themselves into believing 
their venture will inevitably succeed. Such self-
bullshitting could foster the well-documented 
effect of naïve optimism among entrepreneurs 
(de Meza & Southey, 1996). However, even 
empty and misleading claims that are shared 
with another person are typically thought 
through and couched in shared linguistic cate-
gories. This means it is a kind of self-communi-
cation or ‘internal conversation’ (Archer, 2003). 
For this reason, I think that self-focused com-
munication can be meaningfully thought about 
as a specific form of bullshit: self-bullshit. 
Indeed, psychologists have found that more fre-
quent bullshitters were also likely to engage in 
significantly more self-enhancement behav-
iours (Jerrim, Parker, & Shure, 2019; Littrell 
et al., 2020). This led one study to speculate that 
bullshitters also tend to bullshit themselves 
(Pennycook & Rand, 2019).
Explaining Bullshit
Having defined what bullshit is, and what it is 
not, we can move on to ask why bullshit exists. 
In the small but growing interdisciplinary field 
of bullshitology, there are four types of explana-
tion: speaker-focused, audience-focused, social-
structural and social practice.
The most intuitive explanation for why 
bullshit exists is the individual bullshitter. Many 
philosophical accounts assume that particular 
individuals have questionable motives or moral 
flaws which predispose them to bullshitting. 
For instance, Frankfurt points towards ques-
tionable motives of bullshitters such as inten-
tion to mislead their audience for personal gain 
(Frankfurt, 2005). Others point out that bullshit-
ters are driven by Machiavellian motives like 
deceiving their audience to gain power and 
resources (e.g. Penny, 2010). More recently, 
Cassam (2016) has argued that bullshitters are 
plagued by ‘epistemological vices’ such as 
carelessness, negligence, dogmatism and preju-
dice. Perhaps the most important of these is 
‘epistemic insouciance’ (Baird & Calvard, 
2018; Cassam, 2018). This entails ‘a casual lack 
of concern about the facts or an indifference to 
whether their political statements have any 
basis in reality’ (Cassam, 2018, p. 2). Some 
have argued that bullshitters suffer from cogni-
tive failures. Littrell and colleagues (2020) 
found that bullshitters tend to have lower cogni-
tive ability, be less honest, less open-minded, 
have lower feelings of self-worth and a higher 
tendency for self-enhancement. Finally, a recent 
study of school children found that bullshitters 
shared demographic characteristics; they were 
more likely to be males from better-off socio-
economic background (Jerrim et al., 2019).
Focusing on the characteristics of a bullshit-
ter does not explain why some people are will-
ing to accept misleading and empty claims. 
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This paucity has led a group of psychologists to 
offer a second way of explaining the existence 
of bullshit. They have shifted attention from the 
characteristics of the bullshitter to the charac-
teristics of the audience. There is long stream of 
work in cognitive and developmental psychol-
ogy which shows that most people are not par-
ticularly good at spotting deceptive or 
misleading statements (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006). It is much more difficult for us to engage 
in the difficult cognitive work of consciously 
and deliberative reflecting on new information 
to decide whether it is true or not (Gilbert, 1991; 
cf. Hasson, Simmons, & Todorov, 2005). For 
instance, one laboratory study found that people 
are more likely to accept the statements of a flu-
ent dodger (a person who talks well but doesn’t 
answer a question) than someone who is less 
fluent but answers the question (Rogers & 
Norton, 2011). During the last five years or so, 
a body of psychological work has emerged 
which has uncovered variation in acceptance of 
misleading statements. Those who are most 
receptive to bullshit had ‘uncritically open 
minds’. They are ‘less reflective, lower in cog-
nitive ability (i.e., verbal and fluid intelligence, 
numeracy), are more prone to ontological con-
fusions and conspiratorial ideation, are more 
likely to hold religious and paranormal beliefs, 
and are more likely to endorse complementary 
and alternative medicine’ (Pennycook et al., 
2015, p. 559). The study found that people with 
uncritically open minds were more likely to 
assess tweets by the New Age guru Deepak 
Chopra as being profound statements of truth. 
Interestingly, they were also likely to say that 
randomly generated sentences were also pro-
found statements of truth. Subsequent studies 
have found that people with uncritical open 
minds are also more likely to accept fake news 
(Pennycook & Rand, 2019) and see illusory 
patterns in images where there were no patterns 
(Walker, Turpin, Stolz, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 
2019). Other work has started to explore how 
receptiveness to bullshit is correlated with fac-
tors such as personality (Bainbridge, Quinlan, 
Mar, & Smillie, 2019), political beliefs (Nilsson, 
Erlandsson, & Västfjäll, 2019; Sterling, Jost, & 
Pennycook, 2016) and perceptions of the status 
of the speaker (Gligorić & Vilotijević, 2019).
Focusing on the characteristics of bullshit-
ters and their audience means we can ignore 
the role of wider social structures. This gap has 
led to a third approach to explaining the exist-
ence of bullshit. For instance, Mats Alvesson 
(2013) argued that wider socio-cultural con-
cerns with ‘imagology’ (looks and appearance) 
has encouraged organizations and individuals 
to generate clichés and bullshit. He gives 
examples such as job applicants inflating their 
CVs with impressive sounding skills and posi-
tions and universities engaging in grandiose 
branding campaigns. In my own book on the 
topic, I explored how the changing nature of 
bureaucracy created ideal conditions for 
bullshit (Spicer, 2017). I argued that the rise of 
‘neocracies’ which are obsessed with constant 
change and novelty has led organizations as 
well as people working within them to produce 
a large stream of bullshit. Graeber (2018) 
argued that features of contemporary capital-
ism such as increasing automation, powerful 
people hoping to dominate others and a desire 
for social aggrandisement give rise to socially 
useless and existentially meaningless ‘bullshit 
jobs’. These are
jobs that are primarily or entirely made up of 
tasks that the person doing the job considers to be 
pointless, unnecessary, or even pernicious. . . . 
were they to disappear, it would make no 
difference whatsoever. Above all, these are jobs 
that the holders themselves feel should not exist. 
(Graeber, 2018, p. 24)
A recent study found that about 8% of the 
population think they work in a ‘bullshit job’ 
while a further 17% of people are doubtful of 
the social value of their job (Dur & van Lent, 
2019).
Bullshit as a Social Practice
Social structural explanations largely overlook 
the social interactions in which bullshitting 
arises and evolves. This paucity has led to a 
fourth approach which sees bullshit as a social 
Spicer 7
practice. This means viewing bullshitting as a 
shared form of social interaction which is 
accepted or even encouraged within a particular 
community (Christensen et al., 2019, pp. 1595-
7). It entails looking at the way people used 
bullshitting to participate in a community, 
negotiate practical challenges, create and main-
tain an identity, and ultimately reproduce the 
community of which they are part.
One of the rare examples of an analysis of 
bullshitting as a social practice is Joshua 
Wakeham’s (2017) theoretical account. Drawing 
on studies of social epistemology, he argues that 
we gain most of our knowledge second hand. 
This means that we do not do epistemic due dili-
gence ourselves. We are usually not cognitively 
equipped to do such due diligence, and even 
when we are, it is exhausting for us and alienat-
ing for others. Furthermore, in most social set-
tings there is not one obvious correct answer 
waiting to be found (Fuller, 2006). So instead of 
relying on common standards of epistemology, 
we rely upon social cues to sort out which 
knowledge claims are true and which are false. 
These include the characteristics of the person 
speaking, the background knowledge that peo-
ple draw on, and the interactional dynamics 
between parties. Often our reliance upon social 
cues means we systematically relax our epis-
temic norms to deal with ‘the social pragmatic 
need to get along’ (Wakeham, 2017, p. 33). 
This makes us ‘accustomed to faking it and 
going along with social fictions when necessary’ 
(p. 33).
To understand bullshit as a social practice, 
let’s take a brief look at Jackall’s (1986) study of 
a large American corporation. He found that 
bullshitting was systematically expected of mid-
dle managers in the company. One informant 
told Jackall that his job involved ‘characterizing 
the reality of a situation with any description that 
is necessary to make that situation more palata-
ble to some group that matters . . . Everyone 
knows that it’s bullshit, but it’s accepted. This is 
the game’ (Jackall, 1986, p. 145). A crucial aspect 
was not using too much or too little bullshit, and 
also being able to judge the appropriate moment 
to bullshit. Competent bullshitters also needed to 
become competent audience members for per-
formances of bullshit. They had to learn that 
bullshit should not be taken too seriously and it 
should be engaged with in just the right way. If 
you took bullshit too seriously, you ran the risk 
of being seen as a chump. Likewise, if you chal-
lenged bullshit too frequently, you risked being 
seen as an asshole.
A second example of the social practice of 
bullshitting at work can be found in a study of 
health and safety practices in the Norwegian 
offshore oil industry (du Plessis & Vandeskog, 
2020). They found that many of the onshore 
agencies were adept users of the language of 
‘resilience’. The researchers noticed that 
onshore staff such as managers from a large oil 
company and government officials were adept 
at speaking at length about resilience, but rarely 
would they be specific about what they actually 
meant. This meant the concept was essentially 
‘unclarifiable’ and could be applied to almost 
any aspects of the shipping operation. The off-
shore operational staff were skeptical and indif-
ferent about ‘resilence’. The offshore staff 
could talk about resilience when they were 
expected to (for instance, when a safety inspec-
tor arrived), but they didn’t seriously believe in 
it. One ship captain described resilience talk as 
‘toilet paper’ which he only used to ‘cover my 
arse’. Offshore operatives used the language of 
resilience as a kind of game they were expected 
to play if they wanted to legitimate their work 
in the eyes of distant bureaucratic bodies who 
would infrequently take an interest in them. 
They needed to play the bullshit game if they 
wanted to keep the authorities off their back.
A third example of bullshitting in the work-
place can be found in an ethnographic study of 
police officers in Copenhagen (Sausdal, 2020). 
While following officers on their long and often 
boring shifts, Sausdal noticed that they would 
occasionally talk in crude and violent terms. 
They talked about prisoners as ‘filthy animals’, 
laughed about the bombing of a foreign village, 
ignored the desecration of a cemetery and dis-
cussed crushing the skull of a suspect. Sausdal 
was confused. This kind of disturbing talk stood 
in stark opposition to the routine and dutiful 
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behaviours of the officers he had observed. 
Over time, he realized that this kind of talk was 
best thought of as bullshit. It was ‘mean yet 
meaningless’ (Sausdal, 2020, p. 96). He real-
ized this talk was bullshit which wasn’t sup-
posed to mean anything substantive. They were 
often ‘saying stupid things just for the sake of 
saying stupid things – bullshitting for the sake 
of bullshitting’ (p. 104). Officers saw it as way 
of ‘stirring things up’ during a tedious shift. 
They relied on the fact that fellow police offic-
ers clearly knew when one of their number was 
bullshitting. They also knew that these crude 
and violent outbursts were fantasies (which 
they usually didn’t find that appealing). One 
police officer explained that ‘We are obviously 
being obscene when saying stuff like that. And, 
yes, we know it’s tasteless, but that’s the point 
really. Besides that, there’s often no real point 
to it’ (p. 107). In short, bullshitting was a way to 
pass the time – but it was also a way to be part 
of the informal culture of the police force.
A Theory of Bullshitting
In this paper, I will build on the idea that 
bullshitting is a social practice. In particular, I 
will develop the idea that some speech commu-
nities encourage the language game of bullshit-
ting. By playing this language game, people can 
support (or in some cases undermine) their 
image and identity. This in turn can give rise to 
vicious or virtuous circles of bullshitting. I will 
argue that speech communities tend to encour-
age bullshitting when they have three character-
istics: they are occupied by many conceptual 
entrepreneurs (who create a plentiful supply of 
bullshit), there is noisy ignorance (which cre-
ates a demand for bullshit) and there is permis-
sive uncertainty (which creates an opportunity 
for bullshitting). Such speech communities give 
rise to the language game of bullshitting. This 
entails participants articulating misleading 
statements, processing them in a shallow way in 
order to maintain a sense of surface-level agree-
ment between the players. When this game 
works smoothly, it can enhance the image and 
identity of the players. This often leads them to 
continue playing the bullshit game. It also rein-
forces the speech community which supports 
the game. However, when the game of bullshit-
ting misfires, it can undermine the image and 
identity of players. If this happens, people are 
less likely to continue playing the game and are 
less likely to continue investing in the speech 
community (see Figure 1).
Speech community
The practice of bullshitting doesn’t come out of 
nowhere. It tends to be nurtured within particu-
lar speech communities. According to Gumperz 
(1968, p. 66) a speech community is ‘any 
human aggregate characterized by regular and 















Figure 1. A Theory of Bullshitting.
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frequent interaction by means of a shared body 
of verbal signs and set off from similar aggre-
gates by significant differences in language 
usage’. Speech communities are built around 
shared linguistic repertoires, common linguis-
tics norms, as well as shared linguistics compe-
tencies (Morgan, 2004). Speech communities 
can be geographically bounded groups such as 
residents of the Lower East Side in New York 
City (Labov, 1966), Philadelphia (Labov, 2001) 
or Belfast (Milroy & Milroy, 1992). Speech 
communities can also be national or even trans-
national such as speakers of specialist occupa-
tional languages (Bechky, 2003; Lave & 
Wenger, 1991) or administrative languages 
(Gumperz, 1968). Often these speech commu-
nities can be porous, with people moving in and 
out of them or engaging in ‘code switching’ so 
they can participate in a number of speech com-
munities at once (Morgan, 2004). Often linguis-
tic communities serve as ways of marking out 
group membership. Becoming part of that 
group means learning new ways of speaking. 
Gumperz pointed out that
elaborate linguistic etiquette and stylistic 
conventions that surround them, (mean) classical, 
liturgical, and administrative languages function 
somewhat like secret languages. Mastery of the 
conventions may be more important in gaining 
social success than substantive knowledge of the 
information dispensed through these languages. 
(Gumperz, 1968, p. 70)
In the contexts of organizations, becoming 
part of the speech community of middle man-
agement means learning a set of ‘elaborate lin-
guistic etiquette and stylistic conventions’. 
Often that means learning how to bullshit.
Within a particular speech community, there 
are three core components which are likely to 
make bullshit more prevalent: conceptual entre-
preneurs, noisy ignorance and permissive 
uncertainty.
The first characteristic of the speech com-
munity which is conducive to bullshitting is a 
large number of potential suppliers of bullshit. 
One important source of supply are conceptual 
entrepreneurs. These are actors with a stock of 
pre-packaged concepts they try to market to 
others. Many conceptual entrepreneurs operate 
in the management ideas industry. This is a sec-
tor made up of consultants, gurus, thought lead-
ers, publishers and some academics (Sturdy, 
Heusinkveld, Reay, & Strang, 2018). The qual-
ity of actors operating in this industry tends to 
be extremely variable. A consequence is that 
some of the conceptual entrepreneurs seeking 
to peddle their wares in the management ideas 
industry are bullshit merchants. There are some 
sub-sectors of the management ideas industry 
where bullshit merchants are particularly con-
centrated. One is the ‘leadership industries’ 
(Pfeffer, 2015). This sub-sector includes many 
consultants, speakers, experts and advisors who 
create and distribute pseudo-scientific ideas 
about leadership (Alvesson & Spicer, 2013). A 
second sub-sector with a significant concentra-
tion of bullshit merchants is the ‘entrepreneur-
ship industry’ (Hunt & Kiefer, 2017). This is the 
cluster of mentors, (pseudo-)entrepreneurs and 
thought leaders who push poorly evidenced, 
misleading and seductive ideas about entrepre-
neurship. Often their target is so-called ‘wantre-
preneurs’ (Verbruggen & de Vos, 2019). In 
some cases, these ideas have been found to 
encourage vulnerable young people to adopt 
what are seductive but empty and misleading 
ideas about entrepreneurial success (Hartmann, 
Dahl Krabbe, & Spicer, 2019). For instance, 
Chen and Goldstein (forthcoming) followed a 
cohort of students at a mid-ranked North 
American university as they joined a campus-
based business accelerator. Many put their lives 
on hold to launch start-ups. When these eventu-
ally failed, they often found themselves strug-
gling to re-enter the mainstream labour market. 
They also tried to grapple with the ultimately 
meaningless and misleading advice about entre-
preneurship they were exposed to during their 
time in the accelerator.
A second aspect of a speech community 
which can foster bullshitting is noisy ignorance. 
This is when actors lack knowledge about an 
issue yet still feel compelled to talk about it. It 
is not just the result of a lack of cognitive ability 
(however, it could be; Littrell et al., 2020). 
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Rather, noisy ignorance is mainly due to a lack 
of understanding or experience concerning the 
issues being discussed. Often that ignorance has 
been strategically cultivated (McGoey, 2012). 
In some other cases, actors deliberately avoid 
gathering information or knowledge about an 
issue. In other cases, noisy ignorance is created 
by knowledge asymmetries where one party 
knows much more about a particular issue than 
another. When an actor is relatively ignorant 
about an issue, they do not have the wider back-
ground knowledge in order to compare new 
claims. Nor do they have an understanding of 
the right questions they might ask. This means 
they rely on relatively crude understandings of 
an issue yet tend to be much more certain than 
an expert would be (Raab, Fernbach, & Sloman, 
2019).
When ignorance is noisy, uninformed actors 
do not simply stay silent about what they don’t 
know. Rather, they are compelled to speak 
about an issue of which they have little knowl-
edge or understanding. A recent experimental 
study found that this compulsion to speak (cou-
pled with a lack of accountability created by a 
‘social pass’) was an important factor in 
explaining bullshitting (Petrocelli, 2018). 
Similar dynamics have been found in field stud-
ies. For instance, middle managers are often 
relatively ignorant about the work their subor-
dinates are engaged with, but are under pressure 
to act as the leader by doing or say something 
(Alvesson & Spicer, 2016). They fall back upon 
generic management speak rather than engage 
with the people they manage in language they 
find meaningful. A second example is British 
government ministers who find themselves 
with a new policy portfolio (King & Crewe, 
2014). Often these politicians have little or no 
knowledge of the new policy area, but they are 
under pressure to say and do something. To 
address this tricky situation, politicians rely on 
empty and often misleading language.
There also needs to be an opportunity in a 
speech community to use bullshit. Such an 
opportunity typically appears when a speech 
community is infused with permissive uncer-
tainty. This is a situation where actors do not 
know what will happen and are willing to con-
sider almost any knowledge that might plug this 
epistemic gap. They face high levels of uncer-
tainty, yet have permissive epistemic norms 
which guide the problem of sorting out what to 
do. This creates a curious situation where 
almost any knowledge claim goes. When faced 
with a wicked problem such as a significant and 
unexpected environmental change, some organ-
izations experience high levels of uncertainty 
but also find that different kinds of experts 
claim ownership over the problem (Rittel & 
Webber, 1973). This can create experimenta-
tion, participation and dialogue (Ferraro, 
Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005). But equally, it can cre-
ate multiple failures, conflict and drift. Under 
these circumstances, a greater sense of confu-
sion can well up and an ‘anything goes’ 
approach takes hold.
The most obvious aspect involved in this 
kind of situation is a state of uncertainty (Fuller, 
2006; Wakeham, 2017). This entails epistemic 
uncertainty which comes from having imper-
fect knowledge about the world. Epistemic 
uncertainty can also be generated by competing 
and overlapping knowledge claims which cre-
ate a dense patchwork of contradictory truths, 
making it difficult for an actor to make a judge-
ment about what they think is correct. In addi-
tion, people face ontological uncertainty. This 
comes from the fact that social reality is ‘inher-
ently risky and always under construction’ 
(Fuller, 2006, p. 274). Even if an actor acquires 
knowledge about social reality, that social real-
ity can shift and change. Such changeability 
makes it very difficult to be certain of one’s 
judgements.
What makes uncertainty even more difficult 
to deal with is permissiveness. This is created 
by relaxed ‘epistemic vigilance’ (Sperber et al., 
2010). In some settings, relaxing one’s epis-
temic vigilance is a way of investing epistemic 
trust in another person or, at the very minimum, 
as a way of keeping conversation and interac-
tion going (Sperber et al., 2010). This sets up 
what we might call ‘epistemic indulgency pat-
terns’. These are similar to the industrial indul-
gency patterns which entail routine social 
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interactions where an authority figure like a 
manager allows their subordinates to get away 
with otherwise banned behaviour (such as steal-
ing materials from a factory) in exchange for 
compliance (Gouldner, 1954). A similar process 
happens with epistemic claims. This is when 
people are willing to indulge weak claims from 
others in return for indulgence of their own 
weak claims. When this happens, people begin 
to allow weak or empty claims to pass without 
too much scrutiny. If they were to engage in 
greater epistemological due diligence, then 
social interaction would become too costly, 
time-consuming and conflict inducing. These 
epistemic indulgency patterns allow bullshit to 
pass without more serious assessment.
When such epistemological indulgency pat-
terns are paired with endemic uncertainty, it can 
create a confusing, yet liberating situation: no-
one knows what’s happening and which bodies 
of knowledge they should draw on to sort things 
out. For instance, the process of rapid social 
change in the United States during the late 19th 
century created a great sense of uncertainty in 
many people’s lives. It led to the confusing 
multiplication of forms of knowledge and 
authority. This uncertainty coupled with a plu-
ralism created an ideal setting where sham com-
mercial ventures and questionable experts 
peddled their wares. In the medical field, 
‘quacks’ (unlicensed doctors) outnumbered 
licensed doctors by three to one in many parts 
of the country (Janik & Jensen, 2011). Quacks 
offered miracle cures which had no basis in sci-
ence. The market for their ‘bullshit’ cures flour-
ished until the early 20th century when 
legislation reduced the permissiveness associ-
ated with medical knowledge claims. Arguably 
a similar process has occurred in recent years 
with the rise of new technologies such as artifi-
cial intelligence. These new technologies have 
created a great deal of uncertainty, but they 
have also enabled some degree of permissive-
ness around who is able to claim expertise in 
the technology. This has opened up significant 
space for bullshitters who talk about artificial 
intelligence but have little understanding of the 
underlying technology. This makes it not 
terribly surprising that a recent analysis of 
2,830 ‘artificial intelligence’ start-ups in Europe 
found that about 40 percent of them did not use 
AI technology at all (MMC Ventures, 2019).
Language games
The presence of conceptual entrepreneurs, noisy 
ignorance and permissive uncertainty creates a 
speech community which is conducive to bullshit-
ting in organizations. But bullshitting is an active 
process which has a game-like quality to it. This 
is best seen as a language game. I borrow the 
concept from Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958, p. 11) 
who used it to capture how ‘speaking a language 
is part of an activity, a form of life’. These lan-
guage games are ‘rule-governed practice, inte-
grating communication and action’ (Mantere, 
2013, p. 6). They have characteristic moves, play-
ers, strategies and stakes. Learning how to par-
ticipate in a language game enables one to make 
statements which are meaningful in a particular 
context. The example Wittgenstein gave of a lan-
guage game is a group of builders communicat-
ing with one another. He explains how ‘language 
is meant to serve for communication between a 
builder A and an assistant B. A is building with 
building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs 
and beams. B has to pass the stones, in the order 
in which A needs them. For this purpose they use 
a language consisting of the words “block”, “pil-
lar” “slab”, “beam”. A. calls them out; — B 
brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at 
such-and-such a call’ (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 3). 
Wittgenstein goes on to explain how these four 
words (block, pillar, slab, beam) constitute an 
entire ‘primitive language’ and the builder can get 
things done by simply saying ‘block there’, ‘slab 
here’ and so on. Each of these terms (‘block’, 
‘slab’ etc.) gains a meaning within the language 
game. Some of the other examples include form-
ing and testing a hypothesis, making a joke, tell-
ing a story, and reporting an event (Wittgenstein, 
1958, pp. 11–12). Within the context of organiza-
tions, language games can include repeating 
the ideas of management gurus (Astley & 
Zammuto, 1992), developing strategic plans 
(Jalonen, Schildt & Vaara, 2018; Manatre, 2013), 
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engaging in competitive wars (Rindova, Becerra, 
& Contado, 2004), interacting in an online chat 
group (Fayard & DeSanctis, 2010), or engaging 
in an inquiry following a scandal (Kewell, 2006). 
To this list, I would add bullshitting.
At the heart of the language game of 
bullshitting is the act of advancing empty and 
misleading claims. Recent linguistic analysis 
has identified the components of a statement 
that is bullshit (Meibauer, 2016, 2018). These 
are assertions which (1) shows a loose concern 
for the truth, (2) are driven by misrepresenta-
tion of intent and (3) express undue certainty. 
To bullshit, an actor needs to make an asser-
tion which displays a lack of concern for 
standards of truth or falsity. In addition, the 
intent of the statement should be misrepre-
sented. It should not be clearly stated that the 
person is trying to mislead or not speak with 
regard to questions of truth or falsehood. 
Finally, a bullshit statement is typically pre-
sented with much more certainty than is war-
ranted. This means that what are often loose 
conjectures are presented as certainties. An 
example of this can be found in a study of stu-
dents at an elite high-school in the United 
States (Gaztambide-Fernández, 2009, 2011). 
When required to talk with their teachers about 
a particular subject, the students often had not 
put in the required work. To do deal with this 
tricky situation, students would rely on a few 
signals of knowledge (such as a few key names 
or facts). The students would hide their inten-
tions of avoiding scrutiny by feigned fascina-
tion with the topic. But most importantly, they 
would present themselves in an excessively 
confident manner. They hoped this mixture of 
conspicuous signals, feigned interest and 
extreme confidence meant they were able to 
get through lessons with minimal work. And 
typically it worked. After leaving, many of the 
students realized that this ability was the main 
thing they had learned during their time at the 
school. It was a skill which stood them in good 
stead when they took up leadership positions 
throughout American society.
The language game of bullshitting also entails 
responding to empty assertion. In particular, it 
involves the shallow processing of empty and 
misleading claims. This happens when an inter-
locutor who hears a bullshit claim does not 
engage in meaningful inquiry through question-
ing or exploring a claim in more depth (Fallis, 
2015). They can avoid such inquiry in a range of 
different ways (McCarthy et al., 2020). One way 
is through acquiescence. This entails a passive 
response whereby a person faced with a bullshit 
statement lets it pass without any serious chal-
lenge. An example of this is when a senior figure 
takes the floor in a meeting and makes a series of 
empty and misleading statements while the audi-
ence feigns attention and offers no serious public 
challenge (Fleming, 2019). A second potential 
response is enthusiasm. This entails a more 
active and affirmative response whereby an actor 
faced with bullshit responds by joining in. For 
instance, during interactions with managers 
spouting the empty and misleading language of 
leadership, some professionals may respond by 
‘talking the talk’ (Bresnen, Hyde, Hodgson, 
Bailey, & Hassard, 2015). They begin to use the 
language of leadership themselves (which they 
might personally regard as ‘bullshit’) to get the 
attention of their superiors. It can involve a pro-
cess of one-upmanship whereby a listener 
responds with additional bullshit which is even 
more empty and more misleading than the initial 
offering. For instance, sailors talking in a group 
frequently tell increasingly tall stories about their 
exploits on previous voyages (Henningsen & 
Roberts, 1965). A third way people can respond 
is by believing the bullshit. This is when a person 
listening to a bullshitter mistakes what they are 
saying as being an approximation of the truth. In 
many language games of bullshitting, this is a 
sign that the listener is naïve and does not under-
stand the game being played. For instance, in his 
study of hitch-hikers, Mukerji (1978) found that 
young and naïve hitch-hikers would often mis-
take the bullshitting of older hitch-hikers for 
truth statements. This unwarranted belief marked 
the young hitch-hikers out as neophytes who did 
not completely understand the culture and were 
not fully fledged participants in the game of 
bullshitting. A final response to bullshitting is 
negation. This is when someone ‘calls bullshit’ 
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by pointing out the false or misleading nature of 
a statement. Calling bullshit can be an abrupt act 
where someone simply responds ‘that’s bullshit’ 
and in doing so closes down space for inquiry 
and justification. This kind of response can be 
found in online debates about political issues. In 
other cases, bullshit can be called in a more care-
ful way through exploring a claim, charting out 
why it might be considered bullshit and what 
might be done to make it less bullshit. An exam-
ple of this careful calling out of bullshit is 
Rudolph Carnap’s interrogation of Martin 
Heidegger’s phrase ‘the nothing nothings’ (Egan, 
2018). In this important moment in the develop-
ment of 20th-century philosophy, Carnap judi-
ciously interrogated the meaning of the phrase, 
eventually identifying its self-referential nature.
Each of these responses is likely to have 
different effects on the ongoing pattern of 
interaction. The first two responses (acquies-
cence and enthusiasm) can help maintain 
surface-level agreement (Goffman, 1959). 
Through either acquiescing or enthusiastically 
participating, actors can keep the interaction 
going in a polite way. For instance, if an audi-
ence member remains relatively silent while 
their boss spouts bullshit, the social relation-
ship is likely to remain intact. If an actor shows 
that they actually buy into bullshit and begins 
to mistake it for a truth claim, then it is likely 
they will either be sidelined from the bullshit 
game or given some subtle signals (either from 
the bullshitter or other listeners) that they 
should not take it so seriously. This kind of re-
orienting work helps to bring the bullshitter 
back on track. Finally, when a listener actively 
calls bullshit on a speaker, it can disturb the 
surface-level agreement between people. The 
bullshitter can seek to repair this surface-level 
agreement through strategies such as evasive 
bullshitting, whereby they answer a fairly 
direct question with an irrelevant answer 
(Carson, 2010). For instance, following the 
financial crisis of 2008, senior executives of 
some of Britain’s largest banks were asked to 
testify in front of a committee of the UK 
Parliament. When the bankers were quizzed 
about their responsibility for the crisis, many 
responded with evasive bullshit. They 
expressed regret, claimed they had already 
apologized and shifted blame to others 
(Tourish & Hargie, 2012). This evasion had a 
game-like quality. The inquisitors kept asking 
questions aimed at establishing the veracity of 
claims while the bankers continued to avoid 
the questions. This points to a significant chal-
lenge for people calling bullshit: the effort 
they need to put in to refute bullshit is often of 
an order of magnitude greater than what is 
required to produce the bullshit in the first 
place (Brandolini, 2014). This means calling 
out bullshit can be an effortful and time-inten-
sive activity that potentially harms people’s 
relationships, which ultimately is judged to be 
not worth their while.
There are moments when the social practice 
of bullshitting runs smoothly. This happens 
when bullshitters are able to continue articulat-
ing empty and misleading statements, these 
statements are accepted (through either acqui-
escence or enthusiastic embrace) and a degree 
of surface-level agreement is maintained. This 
entire process is likely to involve in situ sense-
making (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2020) whereby 
actors adjust and make changes in response to 
actors involved in the bullshit game. When it 
continues, they are able to maintain a language 
game where questions of truth and falsehood 
are not the yardstick people use to judge state-
ments. Instead, players mobilize different crite-
ria to judge the relative worthiness or relevance 
of a particular statement. For instance, Mukerji 
(1978) noticed that bullshitting among hitch-
hikers was judged on the basis of whether it 
amused people. However, there was always the 
potential for a bullshit game to misfire. This 
happened if an interlocutor called bullshit and 
tried to drag the discussion back to criteria of 
truth and falsity. If this happened, then it became 
much more difficult for people to continue to 
bullshit. It also made it much more difficult for 
people to positively or neutrally respond to 
bullshitting and maintain a sense of surface 
agreement around the bullshit.
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Identity and image
Participating in a language game is a form of 
identity work. It is a way of creating, maintain-
ing and in some cases undermining how others 
see us, and how we see ourselves (Brown, 
2015). When a language game is played compe-
tently, it can reinforce the image others have of 
a bullshitter and how bullshitters see them-
selves. When bullshitting misfires, it can under-
mine the image and identity of bullshitters.
Successful bullshitting enhances the image 
of bullshitters. This happens when bullshitters 
are able to more or less convincingly present 
themselves as more grandiose than they actu-
ally are (Alvesson, 2013). External audiences 
are more likely to make positive judgements 
about them and be more willing to invest 
resources in them. The link between bullshit-
ting, favourable judgement and resourcing can 
be seen in a recent study of the evaluation of 
contemporary art. This study found that when 
abstract images were paired with randomly 
generated ‘bullshit’ titles, they were judged as 
being more profound than images which either 
had no title or a descriptive title (Turpin et al., 
2019). In this context, bullshit was a low-cost 
strategy that encouraged evaluators to see an 
image as more valuable than they otherwise 
would. Organizations often use trendy but mis-
leading names to attract resources (particularly 
from the uninformed). In recent years, firms 
have gained a boost in valuation by adopting a 
name invoking blockchain technology (Cahill, 
Baur, Liu, & Yang, 2020). In the late 1990s, 
firms gained a similar boost in value by adding 
‘.com’ to their name (Cooper, Dimitrov, & Rau, 
2001). In the early 1960s, firms with the suffix 
‘tronics’ were perceived as being more valuable 
(Malkiel, 1999). Some of these firms did not 
actually use the technologies which their name 
invoked, but the title helped them to attract 
resources and higher valuations.
As well as enhancing one’s image, bullshit-
ting can also help to enhance self-identity. This 
is because bullshit can enable bullshitters to 
conjure a kind of ‘self-confidence trick’ (Sturdy, 
Brocklehurst, Winstanley, & Littlejohns, 2006). 
This happens when bullshitters mislead them-
selves into believing their own bullshit. 
Research on self-deception in psychology has 
found that through various cognitive processes 
(such as selective information search, biased 
processing, selective remembering) people are 
able to focus on information which bolsters 
their sense of self and marginalizes any infor-
mation which might undermine their sense of 
self (Schwardmann & Van Der Weele, 2019; 
Smith, Trivers, & Von Hippel, 2017; Von Hippel 
& Trivers, 2011). This has the advantage of lim-
iting the cognitive load of the person making a 
misleading claim. Self-deception enables indi-
viduals to present themselves as much more 
self-confident than they would otherwise seem 
if they had to engage in cognitively taxing pro-
cesses of dual processing (holding in one’s 
mind both the deceptive statement as well as the 
truth). The self-confidence which comes from 
self-deception can aid resource acquisition. For 
instance, entrepreneurs are encouraged to 
ignore their objective chances of failure so they 
can appear self-confident in their search for 
resources to support their venture. This self-
confidence can make it easier to acquire the 
resources an entrepreneur needs, but it can also 
lead to delusional and potentially destructive 
behaviours (; Hartmann et al., 2019; Spicer, 
2017, pp. 123–30).
Bullshitting doesn’t always work so 
smoothly. It can easily misfire. When this hap-
pens, it can lead to negative outcomes. It can 
undermine an actor’s identity. When others 
realize that an actor frequently engages in 
bullshitting, they may begin to mistrust them by 
questioning whether they are competent, benev-
olent and have integrity (Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995). External audiences may see 
bullshitting as a sign that an actor does not 
know what he or she is doing (and is therefore 
incompetent), that they are immoral and do not 
have the best interests of others’ at heart (and is 
therefore malevolent), and that they are unable 
to do what they say they will (and therefore lack 
integrity). If external audiences begin to distrust 
a bullshitter, they are likely to punish or avoid 
them. Their claims can be discounted, resources 
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can be withheld and they might be ignored 
entirely. A study of CEO calls with market ana-
lysts following the announcement of a merger 
or acquisition found that when CEOs used more 
management speak they were punished by the 
stock market with a lower pricing of the firm’s 
shares, irrespective of the longer-term value the 
M&A may create (Salvado & Vermeulen, 
2018). This is because management speak led 
analysts to question a CEO’s motives for under-
taking a merger or acquisition.
When bullshitting misfires, it can undermine 
how bullshitters see themselves. Failures can 
prompt a bullshitter to reflect on the meaning-
fulness of the language which they use. 
Reflection is likely to lead at least some players 
of the bullshit game to the conclusion that their 
chosen activity is meaningless and empty. For 
instance, Paulsen (2017) explored how employ-
ees in a Swedish government employment 
agency reacted when the organization became 
increasingly dominated by empty management 
rhetoric. As this happened, many officials found 
themselves doing what they regarded as socially 
useless and existentially meaningless work. As 
part of their job, they were obliged to reproduce 
a large stock of standardized bullshit terms. 
Some also sought to come up with equally vac-
uous and misleading explanations for the 
importance of their own job. As a result of this 
process, many employees started to see their 
own work as ‘bullshit jobs’.
Bullshitting is unlikely to have purely posi-
tive or negative outcomes. Positives and nega-
tives are likely to be mixed. For instance, 
bullshitters could be seen as rogues who have a 
fine image but are untrustworthy. Similarly, 
those involved in bullshitting can start to see 
themselves as being confident but also engaged 
in something which is ultimately meaningless. 
It is also worth noting that the costs and benefits 
of bullshitting are not equally distributed. Often 
bullshitters try to externalize the identity and 
image costs of bullshitting onto others while 
enjoying the benefits. For instance, one stand-
ard move of populist politicians has been to 
project the lack of trust others have for them 
outwards onto other people or institutions.
Vicious and virtuous circles
Bullshitting can create self-reinforcing or self-
undermining feedback loops. This is dependent 
on whether bullshitting enhances or diminishes 
the image and identity of the bullshitter. Such 
outcomes shape the extent to which bullshitters 
are willing to continue to engage in the lan-
guage game of bullshitting as well as their like-
lihood of continuing to invest in and support the 
broader speech community which encourages 
bullshitting.
When bullshitting enhances an actor’s image 
and identity, they are likely to engage in more 
of it. One way they can do this is by extending 
the scale of their bullshitting. That means using 
quantitatively more empty and misleading 
statements when communicating about a par-
ticular issue. For instance, an organization 
increases the scale of bullshitting when they use 
more empty and misleading phrases in their 
advertising to consumers. A second way 
bullshitting might increase is through extending 
the scope. This is a qualitative shift whereby 
actors bullshit about a wider range of issues or 
in a wider range of forums. For instance, an 
organization would increase the scope of 
bullshitting if it had previously been bullshit-
ting in their advertising to consumers but then 
also began bullshitting in communication with 
employees. An implication of increased scale 
and scope is that becoming a legitimate partici-
pant in the collective conversation also means 
bullshitting. Otherwise veracious people get 
drawn into using bullshit just so they might be 
seen as having a legitimate voice in their organ-
ization. Positive results from bullshitting can 
lead an organization to invest more into the 
speech community which encourages bullshit-
ting. This means they are more likely to rely 
upon the management ideas industry as a source 
of input when making decisions, more likely to 
reward noisy ignorance and more likely to stoke 
up permissive uncertainty. Ultimately, increas-
ing the scale and scope of bullshit and the 
speech community around bullshitting is likely 
to lead to unbounded bullshitting. This is when 
empty and misleading statements have few 
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boundaries and are applied in a wide range of 
contexts.
When bullshit simultaneously enhances and 
undermines an actor’s identity and image, those 
actors are likely to only tactically accept further 
bullshitting. While they may not officially and 
explicitly support further bullshitting, they can 
unofficially tolerate some degree of it. This 
means bullshitting becomes a kind of public 
secret: something everyone knows about, but is 
rarely explicitly acknowledged (Costas & Grey, 
2014). Bullshitting becomes a language game 
which is useful and potentially embarrassing. It 
is allowed but not officially sanctioned. While 
bullshitting still takes place, the scale and scope 
of it is unlikely to increase. While there may be 
ad hoc and unrevealed backing for the speech 
community which supports bullshitting, there is 
little consistent and public support for it. This 
means an organization might continue to draw 
on the services of the management ideas indus-
try, but not in a systematic or public way. It also 
may implicitly allow noisy ignorance, but it 
does not publicly celebrate it as a virtuous form 
of behaviour. Finally, permissive uncertainty 
may be unofficially tolerated and accepted, but 
it is not officially condoned. Under these cir-
cumstances, we are likely to witness the emer-
gence of a bounded form of bullshitting. This is 
when empty and misleading talk is used in a 
limited number of instances and in relation to 
particular issues. Bounded bullshitting involves 
some degree of self-policing by participants. 
While engaging in some bullshitting, partici-
pants typically limit themselves, thereby ensur-
ing they are not going too far. It also means they 
keep an eye on other less bullshit-intensive lan-
guage games which effectively act as a form of 
limitation and constraint.
When bullshitting undermines an actor’s 
image and identity, it is likely to be actively 
punished. Actors typically notice when bullshit-
ting has a detrimental effect on how other 
groups see them. They also are likely to notice 
when bullshitting starts to undermine how they 
see themselves. When this happens, they are 
likely to rein in or even largely cease bullshit-
ting. This may be difficult, particularly when 
bullshitting has become a routinized part of for-
mal communication. But it is possible for peo-
ple to linguistically retool. It is easier to change 
if there are alternative language games bullshit-
ters can retreat into. If bullshitting is punished, 
actors are also likely to curtail their investment 
in the speech community which encourages 
bullshit. This means they become less reliant on 
the management ideas industry, they stop 
rewarding and tolerating noisy ignorance, and 
they tamper down permissive uncertainty 
through stricter epistemic standards.
The Rise and Fall of Bullshit
Bullshitting is a common social practice in 
many organizations. In the previous section, I 
have argued that people engage in bullshitting 
to participate in a speech community, to get 
through day-to-day interactions within that 
community, and to reinforce a positive image 
and identity of themselves. Successful bullshit-
ting can beget more bullshitting. When this 
happens, what starts out as informal bullshitting 
can gradually become a collective routine, then 
part of the formal organization and end up as a 
sacred truth. However, bullshit can backfire. 
When this happens, bullshit can become self-
undermining. Unsuccessful bullshitting can 
beget less bullshit. If this happens, what starts 
as sacred values can end up being revealed as 
bullshit. In what follows, I look at how each of 
these processes happens (see Figure 2).
Escalating bullshit
Like many other social practices, bullshitting 
can be scaled up. This happens when bullshit-
ting gradually broadens from informal improvi-
sation to become routinized interaction and 
eventually becomes a sacred value.
Bullshitting often begins as an informal lan-
guage game which is restricted to a small group 
of people. This is a typical ‘bullshit session’ in 
which a group of close acquaintances trade 
empty and misleading talk as a way of keeping 
social interaction going (Spicer, 2017). It is like 
a piece of improvised social theatre where the 
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participants are the only audience. Just like in a 
theatre performance (or other fictional narra-
tive), participants are willing to suspend their 
disbelief and take on a part so the performance 
can proceed. They are willing to put aside criti-
cal questioning and proceed as if bullshit con-
tained some degree of truth. Once players have 
put aside typical criteria for assess truth claims, 
they need to engage in a process of interpreta-
tion. This entails understanding what is happen-
ing in a social setting where typically standards 
of truth might no longer apply. After developing 
an understanding of what is going on, a would-
be bullshitter moves from being a peripheral 
passive participant who sits and listens to 
become someone who is actively involved. This 
requires some degree of synchronization. The 
bullshitter has to align their own actions and 
words with those of others (Hadida, Tarvainen, 
& Rose, 2015). Finally, a participant must try to 
craft a space for themselves and push the lan-
guage game on by adding to it. They can do this 
through bricolage (Perkmann & Spicer, 2014). 
This entails drawing on a wider stock of cul-
tural resources (such as the products of concep-
tual entrepreneurs as well as past performances 
of bullshit) to fashion something which both 
continues the bullshit session and also adds to 
it. This process can be seen in Layton’s (2010) 
study of street prostitutes in Vancouver. When 
she began studying these women, she realized 
that she had to suspend her usual skepticism 
about their claims if she really wanted to under-
stand their world. Although she spent many 
months studying these women, she remained 
uncertain about when they were bullshitting 
her, when they were saying something truthful, 
and when they were outright lying. Layton 
found that understanding what was bullshit and 
what was not proved to be very difficult to 
determine. She lacked the deep insider knowl-
edge required to make such judgements. As she 
learned more about the lifeworld of the prosti-
tutes, she learned that truth and bullshit often 
were closely woven together. A good under-
standing of the culture enabled her to discern 
the ‘street wisdom’ which was often passed on 
through bullshitting.
Over time, improvising bullshit is likely to 
become a routine. One way this process of rou-
tinization happens is through learning. By 
repeated exposure to and use of bullshit, people 
become accustomed to both the script and how 
it should be performed. This is what happened 
when Cothran (1974) studied swamp dwellers 
in the Southern United States. She slowly 
learned that many shocking tales she was told 
about violence and murder were often little 
more than ‘trash talk’ which shouldn’t be taken 
too seriously. Over time she learned how to play 
her role in this trash talking as well. A second 
way bullshitting can become routinized is 
through anticipation. Anticipation involves co-
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Figure 2. Escalating and De-escalating Bullshitting.
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shaped by a feel for what will happen next 
(Tavory & Eliasoph, 2013). When people begin 
to anticipate bullshit during a social interaction, 
they also start to organize and act accordingly. 
One way is by taking prophylactic measures to 
protect themselves from bullshitting. For 
instance, increasing concerns about ‘fake news’ 
have led many media organizations to antici-
pate that at least some of the information they 
use will have a bullshit-like quality. Anticipating 
bullshit, many media companies have put in 
place prophylactic measures such as independ-
ent fact checkers (Graves, 2016). A third way 
bullshit can become a routine part of an organi-
zation is through reification. This is when a 
fluid and subjective process (such as a language 
game) starts to take on a stable, object-like 
quality (Fleming & Spicer, 2005). Often this 
happens when common, yet changeable, lan-
guage becomes embodied into ‘devices’ which 
have an object-like quality (Martí & Gond, 
2018). Some examples of such devices include 
assessment systems, rankings, metrics, flow 
charts and tick-boxes. When previous empty 
and misleading claims start to be embodied into 
these devices, they develop their own substan-
tive reference point. They start to take on their 
own seemingly objective reference points. This 
makes what might have previously seemed to 
be a vacuous statement appear to have a greater 
degree of substance. For instance, as corporate 
social responsibility has developed as a man-
agement discourse, people working in the CSR 
industries have created a range of CSR metrics 
and rankings (Brès & Gond, 2014; Gond & 
Nyberg, 2017). These have given an objective 
and apparently neutral quality to what was pre-
viously seen as a relatively subjective area.
Over time, routinized bullshitting can gradu-
ally become built into the formal organization. 
When this happens, bullshitting become part of 
the official lingua franca of an organization. 
One way this can happen is through pseudo-
theorizing. Theorization provides a more techni-
cally precise language based on analysis, 
empirical study and design (Maguire, Hardy, & 
Lawrence, 2004; Perkmann & Spicer, 2007). 
Pseudo-theorizing occurs when the external 
trappings of theorizing (such as technical experts 
and scientific language) is present but substan-
tive processes of theorization are absent. One 
way pseudo-theorizing happens is when experts 
with apparently legitimate credentials are mobi-
lized to vouch for empty and misleading ideas. 
This gives bullshitting a sheen of technicality, 
precision and rationality. This is what has hap-
pened to many ‘new age’ ideas as they have fil-
tered into corporate life. Their mystical 
foundations were often obscured through the 
use of more technical and scientific language 
(Purser, 2019; Spicer, 2017). A second way this 
process happens is through sanctioning. This 
entails people in positions of authority (either 
within or outside the organization) deeming par-
ticular forms of bullshitting to be acceptable in 
important organizational forums such as official 
meetings, internal communications and reports. 
Bullshitting can be actively sanctioned through 
authoritative individuals modelling the use of 
the language themselves, bullshit being encoded 
in internal guides and templates, and bullshitting 
being passively sanctioned in organizations. 
Finally, bullshitting becomes formalized through 
publicizing. This is when bullshitting which is 
common inside an organization starts to be used 
in external communication. This is particularly 
important when bullshitting is either taken up in 
external communication by high-profile figures 
or spoken in the collective voice of organization. 
An example of the former is when a CEO begins 
to use empty and misleading terms which are 
common inside the organization in communica-
tion with important external audiences such as 
analysts, the media or politicians.
When bullshit has become part of the formal 
organization for some time, it can slowly start 
to seem valuable in and of itself. When this hap-
pens, bullshit can be treated as sacred. 
Sanctification happens when an element of sec-
ular life (such as bullshitting) is elevated, a 
sense of higher meaning is projected into it, and 
deep existential significance is invested in it 
(Belk, Wallendorf, & Sherry, 1989; Harrison, 
Ashforth, & Corley, 2009). One way bullshit 
can become sanctified is through individual 
meaning seeking. This entails individuals 
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searching for a deeper significance to what is 
ultimately meaningless language. Psychologists 
have found that when subjects are presented 
with various randomly generated words, some 
individuals try to give these words a deep spir-
itual and existential significance (Pennycook 
et al., 2015). A second way bullshit can be sanc-
tified is through organizations providing mean-
ing through ideology. Organizations try to do 
this by drawing on what might have been empty, 
meaningless and highly fluid words to give 
them a deeper sense of existential significance. 
When this happens, meaningless and mislead-
ing statements become empty signifiers 
(Cederström & Spicer, 2014). For instance, dur-
ing the 1980s, the concept of ‘quality’ inspired 
almost religious reverence and was used to 
speak about almost anything from product 
design to human resource policies (Xu, 1999). 
Finally, bullshit can become sacrilized when it 
is legitimated by wider institutions. This hap-
pens when meaningless terms are embedded 
within commonly accepted practices, rules and 
cognitive schemes. When this happens, what 
was previously bullshitting within a particular 
organization can begin to seem like something 
which is inevitable and highly valuable across 
an entire field. For instance, within the cultural 
sector in the United Kingdom, a wide range of 
empty terms such as ‘creativity’ began to be 
used by actors in increasingly reverential terms 
(Belfiore, 2009). When this happened the idea 
of creativity began to be treated as a sacred 
value.
De-escalating bullshit
Bullshitting doesn’t always work. In the previ-
ous section, I argued that bullshitting can mis-
fire and undermine a bullshitter’s image and 
identity. When this happens, bullshit can be 
undermined and become a less important part of 
social processes. In organizational contexts, 
bullshitting can be undermined through four 
processes: failed improvisation, de-routiniza-
tion, de-formalization and de-sacrilization.
One way by which nascent bullshitting de-
escalates is when improvised social interaction 
fails. For instance, improvisation can fail when 
an actor doesn’t suspend their disbelief and puts 
aside concerns about the truthfulness of a state-
ment to let social interaction flow. For instance, 
a participant in a meeting may resist being 
swept up in a presentation filled with manage-
ment buzzwords and ask for precise under-
standings of how this will work operationally. 
When this happens, resolute disbelief can 
become a significant barrier to ongoing bullshit-
ting. A second way improvisation can be under-
mined is through misunderstanding. This 
happens when an actor doesn’t fully ‘get’ that 
they are involved in a bullshit session. When 
this happens, they might mistake bullshitting 
for outright lies or even statements of truth. For 
instance, novice hitch-hikers sometimes think 
the tall tales of ‘old hands’ are statements of 
truth (Mukerji, 1978). Although this could be 
momentarily amusing, it often proved to be 
awkward. A final way that improvised bullshit-
ting can be undermined is through linguistic 
incompetence. For bullshitting to work, you 
need to have at least some level of skill in pull-
ing together claims. When bullshit is poorly 
cobbled together, the emptiness and misleading 
nature of much of the language is likely to spark 
a backlash against the bullshitter.
When bullshitting becomes part of the rou-
tine processes in an organization, it is more 
likely to be undermined through de-routiniza-
tion. One way this happens is through unlearn-
ing. This occurs when actors consciously 
question the bullshit they use in an unthinking 
way. For instance, if a management buzzword is 
identified as bullshit, actors have to consciously 
reflect on their language and find alternatives. A 
second way routine bullshitting can be under-
mined is through anticipatory defence. This 
means actors who expect bullshitting will put in 
place prophylactic measures to protect them-
selves. This is what happened in the media 
industry. A few high-profile scandals concern-
ing journalists making up stories led to large-
scale efforts to expand routine ‘fact checking’ 
in news production process (Graves, 2016). A 
final way routinized bullshit can be interrupted 
is through de-reification. This is when 
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seemingly objective categories and processes 
are revealed to be contingent and subjective 
(Berger & Pullberg, 1965). This happens during 
shocks or crises in an organization, when an 
organization comes into contact with alterna-
tive speech communities, and when outsiders 
disturb the existing speech community.
As well as undermining routinized bullshit-
ting, actors can question bullshit which has 
been integrated into the formal structures of an 
organization. This happens through the process 
of de-formalization where what appeared as 
legitimate organizational processes are shown 
to be illegitimate. One way this process can 
occur is through theorizing. This is when claims 
which appear to have a rational gloss are sub-
jected to deeper and more searching inquiry by 
experts. For instance, overblown claims about 
the effectiveness of a management technique 
may be deflated through careful empirical 
tracking of actual impacts. A second way 
bullshit can be deformalized is through de-
sanctioning. This can occur when people in for-
mal positions of leadership ‘call out’ bullshit in 
an organization and question its use. When this 
happens, organizational members are less likely 
to routinely bullshit. Finally, bullshit can be 
deformalized through public repudiation. This 
happens when an organization as a whole com-
mits itself to avoiding management jargon, 
unnecessary acronyms and other forms of busi-
ness bullshit. For instance, some organizations 
have adopted ‘no bullshit’ rules. Although an 
organization may informally continue to use 
some forms of bullshit, this public repudiation 
is likely to serve as a device people can use to 
effectively challenge the use of bullshit in the 
organization.
A final way in which bullshit can be under-
mined is through de-sacrilization. This entails 
questioning the deep emotional and moral value 
attributed to a particular term. De-sacrilization 
can be sparked by individual crises of meaning 
when individuals begin to recognize the mean-
inglessness and potential emptiness associated 
with bullshit. Such existential explorations are 
likely to be sparked by periods of reflection or 
intense experiences which call into question 
deeply held values. An example of this process 
is when individuals going through career transi-
tions have to question their existing values and 
begin to see what they once thought of as sacred 
as ‘bullshit’. De-sacrilization can also take 
place when organizations systematically under-
mine the meaning associated with a particular 
bullshit vocabulary. This occurs when there are 
systematic and collective attempts to highlight 
the lack of meaning or potential emptiness in a 
particular vocabulary. For instance, organiza-
tions engaged in a significant change process 
might highlight the empty nature of what had 
previously been seen as very meaningful lan-
guage. Finally, vocabulary can be de-institu-
tionalized by field-level actors. An example of 
this is when a particular management fad is 
called into disrepute across an entire field and 
starts to be treated as ‘bullshit’.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that bullshitting 
should be seen as a social practice. People 
engage in bullshitting in organizations so they 
can fit into a speech community, get things done 
in day-to-day interaction and bolster their image 
and identity. Bullshitting is most likely to arise 
in speech communities where there are many 
conceptual entrepreneurs, which are dominated 
by noisy ignorance and characterized by per-
missive uncertainty. These kinds of speech 
communities encourage the language game of 
bullshitting. This language game entails an 
actor articulating bullshit, it being processed in 
a shallow way and a sense of surface-level 
agreement being maintained. If this language 
game works, then it enhances players’ image 
and identity. When this happens, they are more 
likely to re-engage in practices of bullshitting 
and reinvest in the wider speech community 
which supports it. If bullshitting misfires, then 
it undermines an actor’s image and identity. 
This in turn encourages actors not to re-engage 
in further bullshitting or reinvest in the speech 
community which supports it. Bullshitting 
tends to evolve and it can be scaled up. When 
this happens, bullshitting shifts from being a 
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relatively informal practice into a collective 
routine, then a formalized procedure and even-
tually can become a sacred ritual. However, 
bullshit can also be undermined when it mis-
fires. When this happens, what seems like a 
sacred value can end up being seen as bullshit.
Contributions
At the narrowest, this paper extends the emerg-
ing field of ‘bullshitology’. Existing work has 
largely focused on the intentions of the speaker 
(e.g. Frankfurt, 2005), the characteristics of the 
audience which make them susceptible to 
bullshit (e.g. Pennycook et al., 2015) and the 
social structure which encourages bullshitting 
(e.g. Graeber, 2018). Building on recent work 
which understands bullshitting as a social prac-
tice (e.g. Wakeham, 2017), I have argued that 
bullshitting is a routinized linguistic interaction 
which takes place in a speech community. 
Bullshitting can become, in Wittgenstein’s 
words, ‘a form of life’ which infuses large parts 
of day-to-day interaction in an organization. This 
takes the focus away from particular individuals 
and their cognitive failures or devious intentions. 
Instead, it reminds us that bullshitting is some-
thing that fairly rational and ethical people par-
ticipate in because it is the linguistic norm in a 
particular setting. Talking bullshit becomes the 
way one becomes a viable member of a linguistic 
community. Calling out bullshit can be difficult 
not just because it is time-consuming (Brandolini, 
2014), but also because it involves challenging 
the community one is part of, the language which 
holds it together and one’s own sense of self.
Seeing bullshitting as a social practice 
reminds us that, like any practice, it is a product 
of a wider community which structures and 
feeds it. I have pointed out that there are three 
characteristics of a speech community that can 
support the practice of bullshitting in organiza-
tions. These are conceptual entrepreneurs, noisy 
ignorance and permissive uncertainty. By recog-
nizing that bullshitting in organizations is driven 
by these wider factors, we begin to see how it is 
not simply personal choice or poor reasoning 
which leads people to become enthusiastic 
bullshitters. Rather, bullshit is partially prompted 
by the community of which one is a part.
Seeing bullshit as a social practice reminds 
us that it is not just a single linguistic occur-
rence. Instead, bullshit often exists within a 
stream of speech acts. This process of learning 
how to play the bullshit game can be reinforced 
or undermined overtime. People are likely to be 
either punished or rewarded for engaging in 
acts of bullshitting. I have argued that the more 
one is rewarded for bullshitting, the more likely 
one is to engage in it. This means there is scope 
for people to get stuck in bullshit traps. When 
this happens, it can increase the scope of 
bullshitting from small and tolerable levels to 
larger, more intolerable levels. Bullshit can go 
from a bounded activity to an unbounded one. 
When this happens, bullshitting is likely to 
move from being a net positive activity to being 
one which has more negative consequences. 
This can create problems for individuals, organ-
izations and entire sectors.
Finally, by seeing bullshit as a social practice, 
I have tried to challenge the assumption that 
bullshitting is always something bad. Like any 
language game, bullshitting can result in both 
positive and negative outcomes. I have pointed 
out that bullshitting can undermine an actor’s 
image as well as their identity. Bullshitting can 
have some positive consequences such as 
increasing self-confidence and building an exter-
nal sense of legitimacy. Recognizing that 
bullshitting can sometimes be positive – at least 
in the short term – gives us a better sense of why 
people in organizations may be willing to over-
look it, accept it and even indulge in it. In addi-
tion, it gives a sense of the potential dilemmas 
that people are likely to face when they are 
caught between pro-social goals (such as being 
polite) and epistemic goals (such as seeking out 
the truth).
Limitations
Seeing bullshit as a social practice has a num-
ber of important limitations. First, it is impor-
tant to note that not all communication in 
organizational life is bullshit. There are many 
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forms of communication which cannot be 
strictly considered in this truth–bullshit–lies 
continuum. Second, identifying bullshit can be 
difficult. The philosophical literature offers 
some clear guidelines for picking out bullshit 
statements, but these remain relatively broad in 
scope. This means there is a significant scope 
for interpretation in when to deem one state-
ment to be bullshit and another to be non-
bullshit. This interpretive scope implies that we 
are likely to be self-serving when engaging in 
bullshit spotting. This means we are unlikely to 
deem many of our own statements to be 
bullshit, while we are more likely to label the 
statements of others as bullshit. A wider inter-
pretive scope opens up space for intense politi-
cal struggles over what counts as bullshit and 
what does not.
Finally, this interpretive flexibility points to 
a wider problem with many statements around 
bullshit. The claim that you can make a distinc-
tion between truth, lies and bullshit assumes a 
realist approach where it is at least potentially 
possible to make a distinction between true and 
false statements (Fuller, 2006). However, if one 
begins with anti-realist assumptions which 
regard reality as always in the process of 
becoming and any truth claim as involving an 
inherent degree of uncertainty, then it becomes 
much more difficult to make clear distinctions 
between truth, lies and bullshit. Indeed, the very 
act of bullshitting could be seen as a kind of 
experimentation with the truth.
Future research
My argument establishes a wider research 
agenda for the study of bullshit in organiza-
tions. There are four particularly promising 
questions which would repay future study. First, 
researchers might explore how bullshitting 
emerges. To do this, researchers might investi-
gate exogenous factors such as the role of the 
various triggers conditions I have highlighted. 
Research also might explore endogenous fac-
tors within a field which lead to the spread of 
bullshitting such as social learning, incentives, 
status and power dynamics. Second, further 
research could explore in more depth the social 
practices involved in bullshitting. This would 
look at how bullshitters try to mislead, how 
they are accepted (or not) by the audience and 
the process through which any mutual adjust-
ment takes place. To do this, researchers would 
have to look at the real-time processes involved 
in bullshitting. Third, researchers need to 
explore the consequences of bullshitting in 
more detail. This would involve weighing up 
the positive and negative consequences of 
bullshit over both the short and longer term. To 
do this, they would need to ask about the impact 
of bullshitting for individuals, and also for col-
lective actors like organizations as a whole. 
This would allow us to begin to understand both 
the positive and the negative consequences of 
bullshitting and how this trade-off process 
works. Finally, future research could empiri-
cally investigate how bullshit gets scaled up or 
undermined in organizations. This could entail 
looking in more detail at how bullshit shifts 
from being an improvised local language game 
through a process of routinization and formali-
zation and eventually becomes seen as sacred. 
It could also entail looking at how bullshit 
declines in an organizational setting. Doing this 
through longitudinal research would give us a 
sense of how bullshit can evolve and change 
over time.
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